Prereq: "3.5.3"
diff -ur --new-file /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/global/mail_version.h ./src/global/mail_version.h
--- /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/global/mail_version.h 2020-06-14 16:52:23.000000000 -0400
+++ ./src/global/mail_version.h 2020-06-27 17:30:07.000000000 -0400
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
* Patches change both the patchlevel and the release date. Snapshots have no
* patchlevel; they change the release date only.
*/
-#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20200614"
-#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.5.3"
+#define MAIL_RELEASE_DATE "20200627"
+#define MAIL_VERSION_NUMBER "3.5.4"
#ifdef SNAPSHOT
#define MAIL_VERSION_DATE "-" MAIL_RELEASE_DATE
diff -ur --new-file /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/HISTORY ./HISTORY
--- /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/HISTORY 2020-06-10 17:08:14.000000000 -0400
+++ ./HISTORY 2020-06-27 17:18:55.000000000 -0400
@@ -24753,3 +24753,41 @@
client. Reported by J��n M��t��, fixed by Viktor Dukhovni.
File: tls/tls_misc.c.
+20200617
+
+ Bugfix (introduced: Postfix 3.4): the connection_reuse
+ attribute in smtp_tls_policy_maps resulted in an "invalid
+ attribute name" error. Fix by Thorsten Habich. File:
+ smtp/smtp_tls_policy.c.
+
+20200619
+
+ Bugfix (introduced: Postfix 3.4): SMTP over TLS connection
+ reuse was broken for configurations that use explicit trust
+ anchors. Reported by Thorsten Habich. Cause: the tlsproxy
+ client was sending a zero certificate length. File:
+ tls/tls_proxy_client_print.c.
+
+20200620
+
+ Bugfix (introduced: Postfix 3.4): SMTP over TLS connection
+ reuse was broken for configurations that use explicit trust
+ anchors. Reported by Thorsten Habich. Fixed by calling DANE
+ initialization unconditionally (WTF). File: tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c.
+
+20200626
+
+ Bugfix (introduced: Postfix 2.11): The Postfix smtp(8)
+ client did not send the right SNI name when the TLSA base
+ domain was a secure CNAME expansion of the MX hostname (or
+ non-MX nexthop domain). Domains with CNAME expanded MX hosts
+ are not conformant with RFC5321, and so are rare. Even more
+ rare are MX hosts with TLSA records for their CNAME expansion.
+ For this to matter, the remote SMTP server would also have
+ to select its certificate based on the SNI name in such a
+ way that the original MX host would yield a different
+ certificate. Among the ~2 million hosts in the DANE survey,
+ none meet the conditions for returning a different certificate
+ for the expanded CNAME. Therefore, sending the correct SNI
+ name should not break existing mail flows. Fixed by Viktor
+ Dukhovni. File: src/tls/tls_client.c.
diff -ur --new-file /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/smtp/smtp_tls_policy.c ./src/smtp/smtp_tls_policy.c
--- /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/smtp/smtp_tls_policy.c 2018-12-26 14:21:49.000000000 -0500
+++ ./src/smtp/smtp_tls_policy.c 2020-06-17 11:19:54.000000000 -0400
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@
WHERE, name, val);
INVALID_RETURN(tls->why, site_level);
}
+ continue;
}
msg_warn("%s: invalid attribute name: \"%s\"", WHERE, name);
INVALID_RETURN(tls->why, site_level);
diff -ur --new-file /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/tls/tls_client.c ./src/tls/tls_client.c
--- /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/tls/tls_client.c 2020-03-08 10:59:02.000000000 -0400
+++ ./src/tls/tls_client.c 2020-06-27 17:13:06.000000000 -0400
@@ -1018,10 +1018,13 @@
* avoid SNI, and there are no plans to support SNI in the Postfix
* SMTP server).
*
+ * Per RFC7672, the required SNI name is the TLSA "base domain" (the one
+ * used to construct the "_25._tcp.<fqdn>" TLSA record DNS query).
+ *
* Since the hostname is DNSSEC-validated, it must be a DNS FQDN and
* thererefore valid for use with SNI.
*/
- sni = props->host;
+ sni = props->dane->base_domain;
} else if (props->sni && *props->sni) {
if (strcmp(props->sni, "hostname") == 0)
sni = props->host;
diff -ur --new-file /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/tls/tls_proxy_client_print.c ./src/tls/tls_proxy_client_print.c
--- /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/tls/tls_proxy_client_print.c 2019-02-11 08:11:43.000000000 -0500
+++ ./src/tls/tls_proxy_client_print.c 2020-06-19 13:39:34.000000000 -0400
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
i2d_X509(tp->cert, &bp);
if ((char *) bp - STR(buf) != len)
msg_panic("i2d_X509 failed to encode certificate");
+ vstring_set_payload_size(buf, len);
ret = print_fn(fp, flags | ATTR_FLAG_MORE,
SEND_ATTR_DATA(TLS_ATTR_CERT, LEN(buf), STR(buf)),
ATTR_TYPE_END);
@@ -258,6 +259,7 @@
i2d_PUBKEY(tp->pkey, &bp);
if ((char *) bp - STR(buf) != len)
msg_panic("i2d_PUBKEY failed to encode public key");
+ vstring_set_payload_size(buf, len);
ret = print_fn(fp, flags | ATTR_FLAG_MORE,
SEND_ATTR_DATA(TLS_ATTR_PKEY, LEN(buf), STR(buf)),
ATTR_TYPE_END);
diff -ur --new-file /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c ./src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c
--- /var/tmp/postfix-3.5.3/src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c 2020-05-15 09:29:14.000000000 -0400
+++ ./src/tlsproxy/tlsproxy.c 2020-06-20 14:55:59.000000000 -0400
@@ -997,12 +997,12 @@
state->client_start_props->ctx = state->appl_state;
state->client_start_props->fd = state->ciphertext_fd;
/* These predicates and warning belong inside tls_client_start(). */
- if (!TLS_DANE_BASED(state->client_start_props->tls_level)
- || tls_dane_avail())
- state->tls_context = tls_client_start(state->client_start_props);
- else
+ if (!tls_dane_avail() /* mandatory side effects!! */
+ &&TLS_DANE_BASED(state->client_start_props->tls_level))
msg_warn("%s: DANE requested, but not available",
state->client_start_props->namaddr);
+ else
+ state->tls_context = tls_client_start(state->client_start_props);
if (state->tls_context != 0)
return (TLSP_STAT_OK);